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Single Idea 2464

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind ]

Full Idea

Type physicalism is, roughly, the doctrine that psychological kinds are identical to neurological kinds.

Clarification

'Type physicalism' says a given type of mental event is inseparable from a given type of physical event.

Gist of Idea

Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds

Source

Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], App A n.1)

Book Ref

Fodor,Jerry A.: 'The Elm and the Expert' [MIT 1995], p.126

A Reaction

This gets my general support, leaving open the nature of 'kinds'. Presumably the identity is strict, as in 'Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus'. It seems unlikely that if you and I think the 'same' thought, that we have strictly identical brain states.

The 30 ideas from 'The Elm and the Expert'

2432 Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor]
2433 For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor]
2434 Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor]
2436 It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor]
2435 Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving [Fodor]
2437 XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor]
2438 In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor]
2439 Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor]
2441 Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor]
2440 Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor]
2442 Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world [Fodor]
2461 An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time [Fodor]
2459 Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor]
2446 Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor]
2450 Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor]
2463 A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality [Fodor]
2447 Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor]
2462 Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs [Fodor]
2458 Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor]
2460 Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean [Fodor]
2454 We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments [Fodor]
2455 Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused [Fodor]
2443 I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor]
2453 We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor]
2445 Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor]
2452 Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor]
2457 If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor]
2451 To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor]
2464 Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor]
3114 Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor]